

Stabilizing Practice: A Culture of Business at Daniel, Mann, Johnson, and Mendenhall (1960-1984)

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This paper examines the early history of the Los Angeles-based architecture firm Daniel, Mann, Johnson, and Mendenhall (now AECOM) as it morphed into a late capitalist architecture corporation between the 1960s and 1980s. The firm was in desperate need of managerial expertise in 1950 to position it toward growth and profitability; by the 1960s, the demand turned to expertise in engineering; in 1970 to real estate and technology; and in 1980 to managing mergers and acquisitions. Growing by acquiring and merging with a diverse array of firms, services, and resources to keep up with the demands of the urban political economy, the history of DMJM is one of a deft and highly responsive architectural practice. This was made possible by a slow separation of manual work from knowledge work, which allowed the scope of architectural work to be broadened within the office to include the financial, technological, and social processes that undergirded the built environment and that could provide a wider basis for practice.

INTRODUCTION

It was a smoggy Los Angeles morning in 1949, when three tense architects sat down together in their cramped Lafayette Park office to assess the wilting status of their young partnership. Tall stacks of unpaid bills teetered unsteadily each time a person dashed by them, and the founding partners returned home each week with their heads hanging low and, if lucky, nearly one-hundred dollars in their pockets. As one business journal recalled, it appeared to be only a matter of time before the firm would “explode apart.”¹ The firm was Daniel, Mann & Johnson, Architects (DMJ), and flashing forward to the year 2016, the founding partners would be stunned to know that it would be ranked as the largest architecture and engineering firm in the world, with 100,000 employees and over 18 billion dollars in annual revenue.² Growing by acquiring and merging with a diverse array of firms, services, and resources to keep up with the demands of the urban political economy, the history of DMJ (later DMJM and now AECOM) is one of a deft and highly responsive late-capitalist architectural practice. At a broad historical glance, the firm illustrates how an active process of renewal and

modification was necessary to establish enduring hegemonies: the firm was in desperate need of managerial expertise in 1950 to position it toward growth and profitability; by the 1960s, the demand turned to expertise in engineering; in 1970 to real estate and technology; and in 1980 to managing mergers and acquisitions. As a responsive capitalist actor, DMJM’s architectural stances were produced by a perpetual need to brace against the risks of a volatile and speculative urban economy, especially as the motif of action shifted from managerialism to entrepreneurialism beginning in the 1960s. As architectural expertise struggled to keep up with urban change, individual members of the firm served as hedges against it. However, this was only made possible by a slow separation of manual work from knowledge work, which allowed the scope of architectural work to be broadened to include the financial, technological, and social institutions that undergirded the built environment and the historically defined role of the architect. This history of DMJM is decidedly post-Fordist, and it presents a view of a late-capitalist architecture corporation as a collection of knowledge workers, which is an alternative view of the corporate architectural office, and it is one that is excluded from the kinds of architectural histories that are often associated with formal and aesthetic exploration.

The public image of practice at DMJM was first and foremost based on commercial ideas, which were published in more issues of *Business Week* and *Fortune* than its buildings were in *Architectural Record* or *Progressive Architecture*. DMJM’s volume of work particularly between the 1960s and 1980s reflected no uniform aesthetic theory, and as a practice, it became known as an assemblage of firms within a firm—both of which contributed to its economic longevity. Engaged in school buildings and military projects during the 1950s and 60s, and later in massive infrastructure and city planning projects during the 70s and 80s, DMJM emerged as a Cold War corporation with a focus on assembling expertise that served as a way to: 1) expand and make fluid what was construed as architectural work, and 2) lodge architectural work more deeply into the urban economy.

PRACTICING ARCHITECTURE WITHIN A POST-FORDIST ECONOMY

As the post-war boom began to falter mid-way through the 1960s, new terms such as “conglomeration” and “synergy” began to pepper the pages of *Fortune* magazine and colonize discourse in business schools. Borrowed from its 16th century origin, “conglomerate” (to ball together) and synergy (working together) were used in business studies to describe large-scale, heterogeneous production that gained momentum by dipping into diversified markets and by acquiring a number of

smaller organizations.³ The emergence of the terms marked a profound departure from modernist development that had been based on Fordist ideals of organized, mechanical mass production.⁴ By the time that business guru Peter Drucker published a revised edition of his 1946 book, *The Concept of the Corporation* in 1972, he acknowledged that the concepts he initially laid out in his study of General Motors had become outmoded by a “post-Fordist” organization. A post-Fordist organization, he argued, was one in which work was “done by people of very different knowledges, working together for a common purpose and for joint results.”⁵ Under Fordism, production and consumption were understood to be coordinated, and thus manual labor and capital output had a direct correlation. The more one worked, the more money one could earn in return. Nathaniel Owings’s motto of accumulation at architecture firm Skidmore Owings and Merrill notably epitomized this sentiment: “To work, we must have volume...Volume meant power. We could try to change men’s minds.”⁶ David Harvey and others have argued that Fordism was too rigid a mode of accumulation, and under post-Fordism, labor and capital became unhinged between the 1940s and 1970s, which resulted in a “flexible” mode of accumulation in Harvey’s analysis, or a “disorganized” flow of capital according to sociologists Scott Lash and John Urry. More specifically, workers could make money without inputting manual labor, they were encouraged to engage in multi-tasking, and work was organized horizontally.⁷ For Drucker, these forces signaled a so-called “post-Capitalist” society, within which economic outputs were no longer based on labor, rather on knowledge itself. In the eighteenth century, he argued, a worker’s knowledge was applied to his tools; in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it was applied to mechanisms of productivity; and by the late 20th century, he argued, it was being applied to knowledge itself.⁸

THE ORIGIN OF DMJM: A FIRM OF IMPASSIVE EQUALS

DMJM gained momentum beginning in the 1950s by tackling projects that trade journals described more as urban “infrastructure” rather than “megastructure,” and many were entirely out of sight. Some were constructed beneath cities’ surfaces, some were deliberately designed to be stealthy, and others were banned from being discussed at the office entirely. In practice, DMJM oriented its view outward, and it grew by assembling an array of what became known as “capital-intensive” subsidiaries and affiliations akin to what Marxist anthropologist Eric Wolf described within his theory of political ecology as “resource bundles.”⁹ Within each of these theories, each additional person, subsidiary, or affiliate was imagined to be of relatively equal social and economic value, which provided a foundation upon which additional actors could be more easily embraced, but which contrasted corporate architectural offices such as Caudill Rowlett Scott, or The Architects Collaborative, in which architects vehemently held onto their spirited control of aesthetic production until they folded, even though market forces insisted that they be more “flexible.”¹⁰

DMJM began in 1946 in Santa Maria, California as Daniel, Mann, and Johnson (DM&J), which was a three-person partnership led by young architects, Philip Daniel, Kenneth Johnson, and Arthur Mann. Like those at many burgeoning architecture offices in the mid-1940s, Daniel, Mann, and Johnson were optimistic about the prospect of a post-War construction boom.¹¹ Alongside the birth of the first group of baby boomers in 1946, they were particularly enthused to take advantage of the shortage of school buildings across California, and so they divided

work by skill: Daniel was the marketer, Mann the designer, and Johnson the technical expert.¹² And, by the end of 1946, Johnson opened a second office in Los Angeles, and trusted engineer-friend Irv Mendenhall worked as their exclusive consulting engineer. Yet, despite the promising construction booms and new office expansions, the first three years of work were financially turbulent, and the idea of specializing in one type of project—schools—proved to be riddled with economic problems.¹³ By the end of 1949, the inability to make a profit began to challenge the viability of an informally organized, architects-only office. Despite their winning of projects, DMJ was not yielding a profit, and each partner was nearly bankrupt. A retrospective account of the hardship was outlined in a 1957 volume of *Management Methods*, in which the partnership was described as being in “sagging shape,” with each partner blaming the other for the firm’s “profit-sapping problems” and with no uniform agreement about the direction of the firm due to internal animosity.¹⁴ In turn, they hired the first of many subsequent “outsiders”—a business consulting firm, Booz, Allen & Hamilton (BAH)—to help them regain financial traction.¹⁵ Upon his arrival to DMJ, the leading consultant, Douglas Russell, found work unbilled, bills uncollected, and business details left unattended, and he outlined a new structure for DMJ that was based on the business structure of BAH itself. The strategy was based on the idea that all partners be considered equals, as well as be familiar with all functions of the practice.¹⁶ Adapted from BAH, the partners agreed to a clearer division of work and a formalized Code of Partnership Ethics, which read:

Acceptance by each member of the management of his firm of his pro rata share of responsibility for the getting of the business and the handling of it.

Unwillingness on the part of all members ever to speak disparagingly of another member to anyone.

Willingness on the part of all members to face all firm problems objectively and dispassionately.

Acceptance by each partner of his responsibility to protect the interests of other partners when delegated the authority and responsibility to act for the other partners.¹⁷

The emphasis on “dispassion” and the eradication of personal disagreements was described by sociologists, including Pierre Bourdieu, as a characteristic of large-scale practice. In his *The Field of Cultural Production*, Bourdieu argued that, unlike avant-gardist art practices, “business is business,” and as such there is no room in business for “feelings.”¹⁸ In an effort to ensure that all of the partners understood and equally respected the value of all aspects of the firm, Russell also initiated a five-year system of “musical chairs” in which each partner would take turns working in each role of the firm for a brief period, including business development, construction supervision, architecture and design, as well as general manager.¹⁹ At the heart of Russell’s strategy was his acknowledgement that the architecture firms most likely to thrive after the war would be those that firstly integrated architecture and engineering services and that secondly recognized that each contributing professional should be understood as social and economic equals. With this in mind, Russell recommended that Irv Mendenhall join the firm as full partner, since the firm was already out-sourcing nearly 50% of the engineering work to him.²⁰




Figure 1: DMJM Organizational Diagram, June 1960. Source: *Architectural Record*.

Although the integration of architecture and engineering services was not an entirely new idea, the attempt to socially level architecture and engineering was. In 1950, with an office of 40 employees, Mendenhall joined the team to form Daniel, Mann, Johnson, and Mendenhall, Architects and Engineers (DMJM), and Russell also joined as partner and general manager of the office. It was this combination of work and organization that would gain momentum over the next several decades and ready the firm for incorporation by 1960.²¹ The idea to integrate engineering and architectural services in the 1950s has been recognized by architectural historians as a trait of the modernization of architecture practices, which is most frequently epitomized by Skidmore Owings and Merrill, yet SOM was a firm based on logics of law rather than business.²² Just as Mendenhall joined DMJM in 1950, engineer John Merrill was finally embraced as a full partner at SOM in 1949.²³ However, when Merrill first joined SOM in 1939, he was only a limited partner despite the fact that his name was represented in the title. Even after becoming full partner, the three SOM partners were not recognized as social equals. During the first half of the 1950s, Owings continued to serve as the general manager, while Skidmore served as the “spiritual leader.”²⁴ Architects, engineers, and business leaders have described DMJM in contrast—as an early, fully-integrated architecture and engineering firm that had no particular project specialization or re-reproducible aesthetic image, which positioned it more favorably toward expansion and growth in a number of industries, and all expertise were viewed as counterparts, including the economist, urban planner, architect, mechanical engineer, structural engineer, or finance worker.²⁵

UNHINGING CAPITAL FROM LABOR: A POST-FORDIST TURN

By the late 1950s, Russell left, and Mendenhall assumed the position of President. A Firm Organization Chart reflected both an emphasis on business planning and supervision, as well as an emerging sign of the post-Fordist separation between drawing labor and business labor (fig. 1). In addition, the chart reflects a clear emphasis on the periphery: toward new markets, clients, and external relationships. With no single-project specialization for the firm, each executive Vice President was responsible for duties both on the corporate board of directors, as well as for the marketing of new work. In addition to a formal Board of Directors, President, and Coordinating Committee, the chart features a dashed-line subsection of “Organization for Clients & Projects,” which was distinct from the rest, and that signified an emerging separation between drawing work (operations) and business work.

Within it, Daniel was responsible for “Commercial and Systems Operations,” and he secured international defense projects including an Air Force base in Okinawa; Mann oversaw “Institutional” Projects and worked locally on school and commercial projects that covered Southern California; Johnson oversaw the “Military Industrial” division and worked on domestic military missile testing and launching facilities; and Mendenhall was responsible for “Engineering Projects” and worked on projects that ranged from dams in India to sewage disposal facilities in California.²⁶ The bulk of the design and production labor was un-proportionally represented by a small “Operations” block, within which a number of sub-charts were created. In addition to an operations chart, there were charts for foreign operations, as well as business development. These external relationships provided both stability and a constant stream of diversified projects to the office, which began to direct attention toward the fringes of the firm’s existing expertise that would become further refined as a marketing strategy in the 1970s. By the late

1960s, for example, the office's Standard Practices Manual included a new section dedicated to "intra-company relationships," which detailed the idea that the firm was both non-hierarchical in its social structure, but also that the focus of the business should be oriented outward. Two of the central intra-company goals were outlined as: "a) Avoidance of status levels, one organizational unit relative to another; and b) Emphasis on the *peripheral* organization elements which constitute our primary relationships to the outside world and clientele."²⁷

FIRM AS A STABLE: FIRMS WITHIN FIRMS

In 1960, DMJM filed its papers for incorporation. As a corporation, DMJM could gain increasing economic footing to align with or to purchase companies beyond its own. At the time, 19th-century partnerships were still the most prominent forms of professional practice, even though economic models favored corporations. Corporations were relatively anonymous entities positioned for maximum profitability, while partnerships, like Skidmore Owings and Merrill, still emphasized its founding individuals.²⁸ DMJM's articles of incorporation attempted to rid it of authorial individuality except its name, defining it as an entity able to: "acquire, by purchase or otherwise, the goodwill, business, property rights, franchises and assets of every kind...of any person, firm, association or corporation."²⁹ Therefore, as new expertise was needed, entire companies and their assets were acquired rather than merely hiring the chief laborer himself, which was a strategy for accumulating expertise and mitigating competition, but also for building up a base of what was referred to internally as "geopolitical" power.³⁰ An early example came in 1965, when a small architecture and engineering office, Alexander & Dorman Architect/Engineer, of Hanford, California was acquired, so that its founder, architect and engineer Albert Dorman—who was a former civil engineer of Disneyland in California—could work for DMJM. Slowly amassing a collection of offices and affiliated subsidiaries, Dorman became President and Chief Operating Officer a decade later, and DMJM became a corporate model of profitability that was attractive to several local companies precisely because it had figured out how to absorb and manage what many within the office referred to as the hyper-individualistic legacy of the architect. Indeed, accounting offices in Southern California and law firms began to study DMJM as a model for their own practices precisely because they, too, were facing similar challenges.³¹

Echoing a growing consensus among architectural and engineering firms at the time, as a 1961 Engineering News Report argued, design firms were becoming increasingly measured by their ability to be "money-makers," rather than by the number of design awards they won. According to the cover of ENR report, if a firm did not make the revenue-based list, it was considered a "loser."³² The editors noted that many firms "beat the market with profitable sidelines," indicating that capital-heavy practices began to supplement and surpass those that were labor-heavy, even if they were not directly related to the practice of architecture or the making of buildings in particular.³³ Indeed, in 1964, the ENR began what would continue as its annual rankings of Top 500 design firms based on revenues alone, indicating a new metric of merit and power that provided an alternative to awards and design recognition, rendering the distinction between cultural and economic value exceedingly clear. By the 1968 ENR listing, DMJM was ranked fourth, and the management team was so gratified that it printed a brochure to circulate internally, citing the definition of "synergism," which emphasized its practices

over the ranking itself, writing: "what we think is important about the record is not just the size ranking. It's the way the size was attained—by a combination of single individuals and specialized operating units joined together to provide each client with the right kind and degree of personal service and professional expertise."³⁴

As DMJM began to form alliances with affiliate companies and acquire firms, the logic and disciplinary boundary of practice also became more porous. Following the post-Fordist logic of disengaged capital from labor, it was acknowledged that the revenue accumulated by the direct labor of architects and engineers within the firm would not be enough to maintain a position of stable economic power. Instead, affiliated companies were laterally formed or invested in to be renewable sources of capital. The emphasis on the periphery was reflected in a revised organizational chart published in 1972, where a list of "affiliates" problematized the idea of an organizational chart based on lines that linked each function.³⁵ Now, indirect sources of capital had become entirely removed. And, labor was described in direct opposition to capital: DMJM would be "labor intensive," while its accumulated subsidiaries and affiliated companies would be "capital extensive (see figure 2)."³⁶

In 1974, Dorman superseded Mendenhall as President, and the company revised its organizational plan to make way for the expansion of services and to better reflect DMJM's culture, but which emphasized the post-Fordist ideals even further. A circular organizational diagram was described in 1969 for internal use to better reflect growth plans of merging with and acquiring other companies, as well as to de-emphasize a vertical approach to organizing. One of the primary objectives was to stimulate growth and to provide an "appealing and workable framework for integration of other highly professional firms which wish to merge their interests with DMJM."³⁷ Correspondingly, by 1970, the prominence of "profitable sidelines" was reflected in the ENR listings, as the firms ranked at the top were increasingly defined as firms with multiple firms within them, and with subsidiaries that allowed them to bridge between planning, engineering, and architecture. However, throughout the 1970s, subsidiaries were few and could be listed as footnotes in the annual ENR reports. By the 1980s, entire pages of the ENR listings were dedicated to listing appendices of "designer affiliates and subsidiaries," with DMJM inching closer to the top 10, and with firms above it, including the Planning Research Corporation, which would later become part of its own collection.

EXPANDED SUBSIDIARIES

DMJM's collection of affiliated companies were either international offices used as strategic partners, between which certificates of "affiliate friendships" were exchanged, or they were related companies owned or invested in by one of the partners. By 1974, the office's Standard Practices Manual was revised to include a new outline of its "Corporate Objectives," which reflected a greater emphasis on subsidiaries and greater detail about how they would be included. Under "Expanded Activities," the objectives outlined an "overarching goal" to "merge with and/or acquire professional service firms."³⁸ This implied that the practice should continue to expand its "paraprofessional services," in other fields that were "compatible" with the company, and to especially foster active real estate and technology services through affiliated subsidiary businesses.³⁹ In addition, an entire financial section was added to define what a subsidiary was, as well as how new ones should be pursued and managed: the terms "subsidiary" and "affiliate" were




Figure 2: DMJM Organizational Diagram, 1972. Source: *Progressive Architecture*.

collectively referred to as “Subs” and were applied to any corporation or partnership in which DMJM had a direct ownership interest of 20 percent or greater.⁴⁰ Important “Subs” included Real Estate Technology, Inc. (Realtech), which DMJM owned 32% of, and which was a subsidiary of the company Real Estate Resources that DMJM Vice President Tef Kutay co-owned.⁴¹ Realtech spun into one of the largest real estate development companies in Los Angeles, but at the time it allowed DMJM to provide comprehensive developer services to its clients, which became a mode of investment through land acquisition for the firm. Realtech was intended to be able to take larger financial risks in land acquisitions to quickly turn over into equity, but not to hold it. An architectural illustration of the working relationship was a DMJM and Realtech collaboration in 1971, when Realtech acquired the land to develop DMJM’s own 22-story office building, One Park Plaza, on Wilshire Boulevard (fig 3). Within the building, the floor plans were conceptualized as entirely open to prioritize horizontality over verticality, and the building symbolized and housed DMJM’s then 700-person team. The floor plan (fig 4) of the DMJM office was organized around co-dependent groups on the fourth floor, which was referred to as the main production area.

The design area was centered within a sea of departments, with supporting services such as engineering and production radiating outward.⁴² It was differentiated from the architecture area, where most drawing production and drafting was done. The corporate offices, accounting, personnel, contracts, communications, and administrative officers were on the lofted fifth floor. So even though they were defined as “equals,”

they were still hierarchically structured in the building. Another key affiliate company, Logicomp, was an affiliated company owned by founding architect Phillip Daniel initially for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers research laboratory, of which DMJM held 10% interest, and which provided and maintained all computer and communication equipment and services for DMJM as well as other independent companies, predicting that “computer aided engineering and architectural design” and automation would be the way forward.⁴³ A DMJM Univac 9300 Data Communication System was used in tandem with an 1108S, which provided the “pulse” to the computation process. With additional offshoots, including a space planning and interior design affiliate company, Associated Design, Planning and Art (ADPA), a construction contract management company, Atadeco, as well as an Economics Department to conduct financial analysis of development projects, DMJM had become a complete package of services and a nexus of diversified, yet stable, capital.

ARCHITECTURAL PRACTICE IN THE URBAN REALM

Just as the practice was defined in contextual terms, one of the key business leaders predicted that the emphasis in subsequent decades would be not on identifying key project types, but on “the total social and environmental context of the project,” requiring a broad interdisciplinary structure capable of reaching beneath project-specialized work and geographies of other firms.⁴⁴ To respond to such predictions, he imagined DMJM to be process-driven and everywhere. He explained:




Figure 3: One Park Plaza DMJM Office Building, Los Angeles, 1971. Source: *Progressive Architecture*. Photo by: Wayne Thom.



Figure 4: One Park Plaza DMJM Office Building, Los Angeles, 1971. Source: *Progressive Architecture*.

We were not going to be a school firm like Perkins and Will. We were not going to be a high-rise firm like SOM. We were going to be everywhere. Because my own observation was that things went up and down due to funding. The Northeast [United States] might be dead, and the Southwest might be booming; schools [buildings] might be the biggest thing in the world, and then highways might be booming. It would cost us money. When a discipline or a region went down, we would pay a price for it. But overall, we would be steady.⁴⁵

The concept of “urban system” (fig 5) was imagined as a framework through which to design underlying urban environments and structures that mirrored the philosophy of the practice itself: the city, like the assembled corporate structure, was comprised of social, economic, political, and physical subsystems. Vice President Tef Kutay described the idea of total design using urban terms in which the architect could insert himself. Unlike Wagner’s 19th century idea of “Total Work of Art,” or Walter Gropius’s “Total Architecture,” which centered the architect on the designing of everyday objects, Kutay argued that, for DMJM, total design meant to begin with the backdrop, to begin with “the bare land or empty space and move[s] step by step toward the goal of an environment for man’s use and enjoyment.”⁴⁶ In a diagram for an experimental city, each urban subsystem was drawn as clearly bounded and without any overlapping. Architecture was designated as only part of the “physical” attributes of the city—not at all touching the political or economic ones—and a direct opposite to non-material social and cultural subsystems. However, when considering the wider range of practices that architects described and claim to be engaged in, the field of architectural

THE URBAN SYSTEM AND SUBSYSTEMS




Figure 5: A Proposal for an Experimental City, 1968. Source: CSU Dominguez Hills Special Collections.

practice is much wider, rendering the architect as overtly linked to the urban political economy.

CONCLUSION

The practice of merging and acquiring intensified at DMJM in the 1980s and 1990s, but the post-Fordist ethos had been well established. Between 1984 and 1990, DMJM was acquired and held by a Kentucky-based Oil company, Ashland Oil, due to the management capabilities of its leadership. By 1990, Ashland divested interest in the company, leading to a new company, AECOM, which consisted of five companies—of which DMJM was one. However, the firm’s new name, AECOM, was entirely disconnected from the names of its founding partners, was reduced to its anonymized services, yet it carried forth its culture of flexibility and open-endedness. A and E were clear: architecture and engineering. However, the COM was specifically left open-ended and geared toward “flexible accumulation” as the demands of the economy would undoubtedly shift. It could be used to suggest Construction, Operations, and Management, or Contracts, Operations, and Maintenance; or, Construction Management.

Although one might argue that the architects at DMJM in fact undermined by de-politicizing or helped expunge the historical role of the architect, the early history of DMJM illustrates that the architects established a new architectural domain within late-capitalist business structures by expanding the building economy and designing a new terrain of practice upon which the architect operates. Working within a diversified system of revenue streams, the ways in which architects provided economic stability to their office—through technological,

geographical, and social supplements—was reflected in the shape of their imagined urban political economic system. The key, as one of the CEOs of DMJM and fathers of AECOM perpetually reiterates: there was no limit to the architect’s role, as long as he did not mind who gets the credit for his work.

ENDNOTES

1. “Profile of a New Kind of Manager,” *Management Methods* (Sept 1957), p. 28.
2. AECOM, “2015 Annual Report,” January 22, 2016.
3. Editors of FORTUNE, *The Conglomerate Commotion*, New York: The Viking Press, 1970, p. 3.
4. Patrik Schumacher and Christian Rogner, “After Ford,” *Stalking Detroit*, ed. By G. Daskalakis et al., 2001, p. 48.
5. Peter F. Drucker, *Concept of the Corporation*, (New York: The John Day Company, 1972), p. xvi.
6. Nathaniel Owings, *The Spaces in Between: An Architect’s Journey* (Wilmington, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), p. 66.
7. David Harvey, *The Condition of Postmodernity: An Enquiry into the Origins of Cultural Change*, (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Pub., 1989), p. 178
8. In his study of Skidmore Owings and Merrill (SOM) between 1936 and 1954, Hyun Tae Jung argued that, like DMJM, SOM began to constitute an assemblage of various professionals working together, challenging one to “think beyond the traditional territories of the discipline, posing a challenge in writing a historical account of the firm.” See: Hyun Tae Jung, “Organization and Abstraction: The Architecture of Skidmore, Owings & Merrill from 1936 to 1956.” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2011), p. 2.
9. Eric Wolf, “Ownership and Political Ecology,” *Anthropological Quarterly* 45.3 (July 1, 1982), p. 201.
10. For an overview of this demise at CRS, see: Paolo Tombesi, “Capital gains and architectural losses: the transformative journey of Caudill Rowlett Scott (1948–1994),” *Journal of Architectural Education* (2006),145-168.
11. Of particular note, The Architects Collaborative was founded in Cambridge, Massachusetts in 1945, and Caudill Rowlett and Scott in Houston, Texas in 1946.
12. *DMJM Histories 1946-1955*, Internal history notes courtesy of AECOM.
13. The internal history notes an amalgam of milestones alongside important achievements of DMJM during each respective year, including transportation costs, important political markings in the U.S. and globally, or popular culture terms. In the year 1946, for example, the account notes: “Levittown was started; Philippine independence; Population: CA 6,907,400/US: 132,164,600; Median age in U.S.: 29; First Baby Boomer Born; First UN Session; First Digital Computer Dedicated; Baby and Child Care by Dr. Spock; “Notorious” by Hitchcock; Chicken was \$1.00 per pound; A new Corsley Four-Passenger Convertible was \$250; The Bikini Previewed; Atomic Energy Commission Established; New Terms: Automation, Electric Blanket, Ranch Style.
14. “Profile of a New Kind of Manager,” *Management Methods* (Sept 1957): p 27-30.
15. Prior to the consulting work at DMJM, Booz Allen Hamilton was hired by Perkins & Will to gain financial traction. See *Management Methods* (Sept 1957).
16. *Ibid*, p. 27-28.
17. “Profile of a New Kind of Manager” in *Management Methods* (Sept 1957): 30.
18. Pierre Bourdieu, *The Field of Cultural Production*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), p. 62.
19. *Ibid*.
20. The running internal joke was that DM&J actually owed Mendenhall money, and the only way to pay off the debts was to add him as full partner. William Coburn (retired architect) in discussion with the author, July 2016.
21. Norris Leap, “Engineer Manages Team of five Talented Architects to Success,” *Los Angeles Times*, Oct 9, 1960, p. 11.
22. SOM owed its long-term survival to its legal counsel, Marshal Grosscup Sampsel, who negotiated their contracts and extended lines of credit as the firm began. Nat Owings described him unlike Skidmore or Owings, as “orderly,” “calm,” and “cautious.” He was, since 1936, an essential part of the organization yet was detached from it. Owings noted that Sampsel’s partnership documents under which SOM operated were always changing and hardly written down: Sampsel himself epitomized the law and operating agreements. See: Nathaniel Owings, *The Spaces in Between: An Architect’s Journey*, (Wilmington, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), p. 70.
23. Hyun Tae Jung, “Organization and Abstraction: The Architecture of Skidmore, Owings & Merrill from 1936 to 1956.” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2011).
24. Nathaniel Owings, *The Spaces in Between: An Architect’s Journey*, Wilmington, (MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), p. 70.
25. Retired DMJM architect in discussion with the author, February 2016. .
26. *Southwest Builder and Contractor*, (Sept. 27, 1957), p. 4.
27. Emphasis added. “Intra-company Relationships” in *Standard Practices Manual*, September 1, 1969, p. 10. Stanley A. Moe papers, Huntington Library, San Marino, CA.
28. Mary Woods, *From Craft to Profession: The Practice of Architecture in Nineteenth-Century America*, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999), p. 121.
29. “Articles of Incorporation of Daniel, Mann, Johnson, & Mendenhall.” Filed by Frank M Jordan, Secretary of State, California, 1 Feb 1960.
30. Retired DMJM architect in discussion with the author, March 2016.
31. DMJM’s business model was a model for other service professions. The prominent accounting firm Arthur Young & Company, for example, credited it for having a superior management structure than many large industrial organizations, and leading law offices in Los Angeles began to use the management structure of DMJM as a model for engaging with practitioner-types that were historically ego driven.
32. Cover, *Engineering News Record*, (1961).
33. *Ibid*.
34. Miscellaneous. Library of Stanley A. Moe, Huntington Library Archives, San Marino, CA.
35. Even in the pre-War beginnings of SOM, for instance, the founding partners were also not able to make a profit and were reluctant to accrue debt, so they opened a direct line of credit with a silent partner, prominent Chicago physician Dr. William Allen Pusey, which allowed the company to remain focused on architecture...The method for charging clients at SOM was by monthly retaining instead of a percentage. See: Owings, p. 69-70.
36. “A Summation of Parts,” *Progressive Architecture* no. 6 (June 1972), p. 74.
37. “DMJM Basic Organization,” *Standard Practices Manual*, 1 Sep 1969, p.1-2. Stanley A. Moe papers, Huntington Library, San Marino, CA.
38. “Corporate Objectives,” *Standard Practices Manual*, 7, January, 1974, pp. 1-3. Stanley A. Moe papers, Huntington Library, San Marino, CA.
39. *Ibid*.
40. “Annual Reports and Plans of Subsidiaries and Affiliates,” *Standard Practices Manual*, 17, Dec 1974, pp. 1-3. Stanley A. Moe papers, Huntington Library, San Marino, CA.
41. “A Summation of Parts,” *Progressive Architecture* no. 6 (June 1972): 74.
42. “One Park Plaza—DMJM’s New World Headquarters,” *DMJM Review*, (Spring 1973): 1.
43. Paul Konkler, “Getting in Step with CAEADS,” *DMJM Review*, (1978): 3.
44. Retired architect, in interview with the author, February 2016.
45. *Ibid*.
46. Tef Kutay, in “Design Director Named by Architectural Firm,” *The Los Angeles Times*, Aug 30, 1964, p. L11.ces *Manual*, 7, January, 1974, pp. 1-3. Stanley A. Moe papers, Huntington Library, San Marino, CA.